Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific: From Normative Vision to Security Statecraft – E-International Relations

Japan’s foreign and security policy changed significantly over the past decade in response to a more contested Indo-Pacific order. Central to this evolution is the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy, which originated under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as a broad, normative vision promoting the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and economic prosperity (Nagy 2021; Hosoya 2019). However, as systemic pressures have intensified – most notably China’s maritime assertiveness, the geopolitical shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – Tokyo has profoundly recalibrated its approach (O’Shea and Maslow 2024). Viewing this shift through the lens of neoclassical realism, this study argues that FOIP has moved from a purely diplomatic vision towards a highly operationalised framework as a concrete security instrument. The transformation, although not a complete abandonment of Japan’s pacifist ideals, is a pragmatic adaptation where acute external threats are filtered through domestic institutional, societal, and legal constraints (Kim 2025). Through the practice of “tactical hedging” and the deployment of new, tangible policy instruments like Official Security Assistance (OSA) and revised defence export guidelines, Japan has successfully merged inclusive regional rhetoric with concrete military balancing, making FOIP both a normative framework and a practical instrument of security policy.

FOIP, originally promoted by Japan as a rules-based, open, and inclusive regional vision, has evolved far beyond a simple diplomatic stance today. In recent years, Japan has introduced stronger security instruments, such as the 2022 security documents, the establishment of OSA in 2023, and revised defence equipment export rules, which have become operational mechanisms for reinterpreting Japan’s FOIP vision. This raises the question: how and why has FOIP changed under a worsening geopolitical environment? The study argues that FOIP has not abandoned its normative foundations, but has increasingly been operationalised through concrete security instruments, including the 2022 Three Security Documents, Official Security Assistance, and revised defence equipment transfer rules.

FOIP between Norms and Strategy

First, one strand of scholarship interprets Japan’s FOIP primarily as a normative and diplomatic posture aimed at preserving a rules-based order through openness, connectivity, and inclusivity. Green (2018) argues that Japan’s strategic worldview revolves around its FOIP vision, which emphasises the inherent benefits from a regional order rooted in the rule of law, transparency, and high-quality rules for trade and infrastructure. This vision has evolved, as highlighted by Hosoya (2019, 25), that Japan has transitioned to a “FOIP 2.0” – shifting away from confrontational rhetoric to emphasise a more cooperative, inclusive, comprehensive vision in response to the voices of Asian countries. Furthermore, Nagy (2021) explains Japan’s approach to regionalism by arguing that FOIP relies on a ‘rational-legal perspective,’ stressing broad cooperation and transparency, and fiscally sustainable infrastructure, as opposed to a more state-centric model.

Secondly, a substantial body of literature reads FOIP less as a neutral order-building but as a more strategic response to China’s rise, maritime assertiveness, and intensifying Indo-Pacific power competition. Nagy (2021, 10) notes that Tomohiko Satake views FOIP as a direct geo-economic alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Driven by existential concerns over open sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the East and South China Seas, Nagy (2021) views FOIP’s focus on maritime security as a response to regional instability and Chinese assertiveness. While navigating the transition of power between the United States and China, Wilkins (2021, 98) describes Australia and Japan as engaging in a “triple hedge,” where middle-power diplomacy through FOIP acts as a critical mechanism to offset risks while remaining traditional security partners with the United States. Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy, according to Naidu and Ishida (2022), deliberately aimed at creating a regional balance of power that could counter China’s growing assertiveness through minilateral coalitions like the Quad and deepening defence cooperation with Southeast Asia. These views of balancing behaviour align with what Koga (2019, 289) conceptualises the FOIP as “tactical hedging” – utilisation of an ambiguous declaratory policy to build coalitions and signal strategic alignment without escalating tensions. 

Third, more recent literature moves beyond what we discuss above as the normative-versus-balancing debate, i.e. Japan’s profound shift into a more proactive security actor. Hughes (2024, 162) extensively analyses the 2022 “three national security documents” – the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, and Defence Buildup Program – arguing they enforce a “radical military trajectory” by discarding the one per cent GDP limit on defence expenditure since 1976. Japan has reinforced its defence capabilities, exclusively altering its defence-oriented policy, thereby increasing debate on Japan’s deviations from past stances and far more change than continuity in core principles (Hughes 2024, 183). Jain (2026, 38) also noted that Japan has replaced post-war idealism with pragmatic realism – expanding the “proactive contribution to peace” mandate through an unprecedented increase in defence budget with further relaxation in arms transfer policy. A pivotal element of this transformation is the introduction of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework in 2023 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2025). Hamada (2025) and Kim (2025) detail how OSA is distinct from Official Development Assistance (ODA) – OSA allows Japan to provide defence equipment directly to like-minded partner countries’ armed forces, helping to strengthen regional deterrence. Furthermore, Midford (2026) highlights the continuous erosion of Japan’s post-war arms export bans, which shows the recent reforms permitting the export of lethal weapons and joint fighter jet development mark a major shift to strengthen its international security partnerships.

What remains less developed is the literature on how Japan’s newer security instruments help transform FOIP from a broader strategic vision into a more concrete form of Japan’s statecraft. Much of the literature discusses FOIP either as a normative vision for international order (e.g. Hosoya 2019; Koga 2019) or as a strategic balancing strategy against China (e.g. Wilkins 2021; Naidu and Ishida 2022). While scholars recognise the macro-level strategic shifts, there remains a gap in systematically linking Japan’s new mechanisms of evolving security frameworks – the deployment of OSA, the relaxation of lethal arms export regulations, and the operationalisation of the three security documents – to the actual execution and materialisation of FOIP’s vision on the ground. 

Theoretical Framework:

This study adopts neoclassical realism as its primary theoretical driver to explain the essence of the recalibration of Japan’s FOIP strategy. Neoclassical realism argues that changes in the international system generate pressures on states; however, these pressures are not translated automatically into foreign policy outcomes (Rose 1998).  As Rose (1998, 150) interpreted, such activities come through a complex process – the pressures are filtered through domestic institutions, including elite perceptions, and legal constraints. This framework fits Japan’s case because it explains both why strategic adjustment occurs and why such adjustment proceeds gradually and selectively, rather than through a sudden break with the past.

This study examines the changing environment of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical structure. This includes China’s growing military and maritime assertiveness and uncertainty over the regional balance of power, which intensifies strategic competition among its neighbouring countries, such as Japan and South Korea. Japan’s response to threats against the regional order, and to its own security and economic prosperity, is mediated by several factors – domestic institutional processes, the dynamics of the US-Japan alliance, and postwar legal and normative constraints on the use and transfer of power (Sherrill and Hough 2015; Tana 2021). In Japan’s foreign policy, these factors help explain why Japan’s strategic adaptation often proceeds incrementally and gradual reinterpretation of policy rather than an outright rupture (Sherrill and Hough 2015, 248).

In the changing Indo-Pacific geopolitical environment, the study examined how Japan’s FOIP strategy is being recalibrated. The language of openness and inclusivity is not abandoned, but FOIP is increasingly supplemented with more concrete security instruments, including the 2022 Three Security Documents, OSA, and revised weapon transfer rules. As a result, neoclassical realism explains the shift in Japanese strategy: worsening external conditions pushed Tokyo to reframe FOIP more operationally and security-oriented, although the shift has been shaped by alliance commitments and domestic constraints.

To explain the style of this recalibration, the study draws on the concept of Kei Koga’s tactical hedging – an ambiguous policy doctrine – that assists the hedger in assessing whether its partners are willing to cooperate; in this case, building a coalition towards the same or similar strategic objectives, though interests are not fully identical (Koga 2025). In Japan’s case, FOIP continues to employ inclusive and non-exclusive rhetoric while deepening its strategic partnerships and security cooperation. As Koga argues, this ambiguity allows Japan to strengthen its regional position, although not framing any outright containment of China (Koga 2025, 110). Considering all these, neoclassical realism explains why FOIP has changed, while tactical hedging clarifies how Japan is implementing that change globally.

From Vision to Security Statecraft: Recalibrating Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Japan’s FOIP, since its inception in 2016, has undergone a profound evolution, shifting from a largely normative diplomatic vision to a highly operational framework of security statecraft (Jain 2026; Koga 2026). This evolution presumably does not represent a complete break from Japan’s post-war pacifist principles but reflects a pragmatic or strategic recalibration designed to navigate an increasingly perilous regional order (Jain 2026; Kim 2025). By 2026, FOIP has entered its second decade while Japan faced a series of severe external shocks, including China’s increasing military and maritime assertiveness, North Korea’s repeated missile tests, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and, most recently, the US-Israel war with Iran. Driven by these severe shocks, Tokyo has shifted from relying almost exclusively on economic diplomacy to adopting a more proactive security posture, thereby embedding tangible military and defence cooperation into the core of its regional engagement (Kim, 2025).

The primary catalyst for this shift is the deteriorating geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific. China’s ascent, with its relentless deployment of maritime “grey-zone” coercion in the East and South China Seas and the intensifying strategic competition between Washington and Beijing, have fundamentally challenged the regional status quo (Kim 2025). For Japan, however, systemic pressure has not translated into unconstrained militarisation. This adaptation, viewed through an analytical lens, is best understood as a mediated process in which intense external threats are filtered through a complex web of domestic and institutional variables. As Kim (2025) expressed, Japan’s pacifist constitution (Article 9) has deeply rooted anti-militaristic public norms, and managing the US-Japan alliance is closely tied to the nature and scope of its policy choices. At the same time, Japanese policymakers cannot engage in pure, overt military balancing for two reasons: the constraints of domestic legal frameworks and the fear of entrapment in American conflict or abandonment by a fluctuating US administration (Naidu and Ishida 2022). However, these domestic constraints causally necessitate an incremental approach that layers new security functions onto established diplomatic practices (Kim 2025). One clear example is the introduction of Official Security Assistance (OSA) in April 2023. Japan’s first OSA package for the Philippines in 2023 provided a coastal radar system and related assistance to improve surveillance capacity. without engaging any overt military balancing (Shioyama 2023). This shows what the incremental strategy of Japanese policymakers entails and how they expand their security roles through established diplomatic instruments, such as assistance programs.

Japan, through careful calibration, employs what Koga termed tactical hedging – an ambiguous, temporary, and declaratory policy doctrine used to manage strategic uncertainty, allowing the state to delay final decisions on long-term alignments while building coalitions (Koga 2025, 110). These ambiguous declaratory policies include universal principles – such as the rule of law, economic prosperity, and freedom of navigation – that are mainly laid out in its FOIP principles. By maintaining a highly inclusive policy like this, Japan avoids explicitly antagonising Beijing while also avoiding the alienation of Southeast Asian partners who are wary of great-power confrontation (Koga 2026). Yet, beneath this cooperative and normative rhetoric, Japan actively facilitates the expansion of its minilateral security networks and deepens defence partnerships. Tokyo has sought to deepen its partnership through joint naval exercises and strategic dialogues with India, Australia, and, increasingly, Indonesia (Jimbo 2025). This dual functionality has allowed FOIP to serve simultaneously as an inclusive normative framework for the international order and as a strategic instrument of statecraft – maximising strategic flexibility while mitigating the risk of economic or military retaliation.

Tokyo’s aim to operationalise the evolving FOIP becomes evident with the watershed release of the 2022 Three Security Documents – the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, and Defence Buildup Program – which codified this strategic shift by committing to double defence spending to meet NATO standards and to acquire counterstrike capabilities, fundamentally altering the US-Japan alliance’s division of labour (Hughes 2024). At the same time, Japan introduced Official Security Assistance (OSA) to project security-statecraft regionally. While traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) forbids military use, OSA is explicitly designed to bypass such institutional hurdles, enabling Tokyo to directly supply non-lethal defence equipment, such as coastal radar systems, to the Philippines – bolstering regional deterrence (Hamada 2025). The ongoing reforms to the defence equipment transfer guidelines have, furthermore, eroded post-war export bans. In 2023, Japan was permitted to transfer lethal weapons, such as Patriot missiles, to the United States and also to develop a joint next-generation fighter jet (Rich and Ueno 2023). These mark some of the determinants that collectively materialised FOIP’s strategic ambitions on the ground.

All these become clearer now that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, holds a 316-seat majority out of 465 in the House of Representatives. Sato (2026) reports that the LDP’s new government is actively pursuing a major policy shift toward arms exports, including proposals to scrap the “five categories of rescue,” the classification of weapons and non-weapons, probable recipient countries and exceptions for conflict zones. 

Japan’s contemporary Indo-Pacific strategy has transcended its origins as a mere blueprint for economic connectivity with a rule-based international order. By carefully navigating Japan’s domestic constraints amid severe geopolitical pressures, Tokyo has successfully institutionalised a proactive and integrated security posture. This nuanced recalibration ensures that OSA “does not represent a radical departure from the past, but the institutionalisation of Japan’s incremental yet bounded security engagement strategy” (Kim 2025, 382).

Conclusion:

The evolution of Japan’s FOIP strategy illustrates a profound recalibration of its national security posture. As Jain (2026) notes, driven by severe geopolitical headwinds, Japan has moved beyond the constraints of its traditional “one-nation pacifism” to embrace a more proactive and realistic approach to regional stability. Utilising a neoclassical realist framework, it becomes clear that Tokyo’s strategic posture is materialised through the 2022 Three Security Documents, the pioneering OSA framework, and the progressive relaxation of arms export bans, all of which have been distinctively shaped and paced by its domestic political and legal shifts. 

Rather than discarding its post-war identity all at once, Japan has engaged in tactical hedging – utilising FOIP’s inclusive and normative rhetoric to legitimise its expanding security networks both at home and abroad. The contemporary iteration of FOIP stands as a testament to Japan’s new pragmatic realism, i.e., an operationalised grand strategy that actively balances against regional revisionist norms, striving to uphold the rules-based international order and ensuring Japan remains a proactive security actor in the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.

Bibliography:

Govella, Kristi. 2021. “The Adaptation of Japanese Economic Statecraft: Trade, Aid, and Technology.” World Trade Review 20: 186–202.

Green, Michael J. 2018. “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ as Grand Strategy.” We Are Tomodachi, Spring 2018. https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2018/spring2018/contributed_article.html

Hamada, Maya. 2025. “Establishment of Japan’s Official Security Assistance (OSA): Background and Significance.” Asia-Pacific Review 32 (2): 12–33.

Hosoya, Yuichi. 2019. “FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Asia-Pacific Review 26 (1): 18–28.

Hughes, Christopher W. 2024. “Japan’s ‘Three National Security Documents’ and Defense Capabilities: Reinforcing a Radical Military Trajectory.” Journal of Japanese Studies 50 (1): 155–183.

Jain, Purnendra. 2024. “Japan’s New Security Assistance to the Indo-Pacific Region.” Observer Research Foundation, January 8, 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/japan-s-new-security-assistance-to-the-indo-pacific-region

Jain, Purnendra. 2026. “Proactive Pacifism and Beyond: Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Pivots to Pragmatism Replacing Idealism.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 13 (1): 33–53.

Jimbo, Ken. 2025. “Japan’s Indo-Pacific Security Cooperation with India, Indonesia and Australia.” Observer Research Foundation, August 2, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/japan-s-indo-pacific-security-cooperation-with-india-indonesia-and-australia

Johnson, Jesse. 2026. “Japan Takes Step Closer to Easing Rules on Export of Lethal Weapons.” Japan Times, February 25, 2026. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/02/25/japan/defense-exports-rules-revision/

Kim, Seunghyun. 2025. “Recalibrating Aid, Reshaping Security Strategy: The Strategic Logic Behind Japan’s Official Security Assistance.” Korean Journal of International Studies 23 (2): 357–393.

Koga, Kei. 2019. “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy: Tokyo’s Tactical Hedging and the Implications for ASEAN.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 41 (2): 286–313.

Koga, Kei. 2025. “Tactical hedging as coalition-building signal: The evolution of Quad and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 27(1): 109-134.

Koga, Kei. 2026. “Withering FOIP? Japan’s Evolving Indo-Pacific Vision from Kishida to Ishiba.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 13 (1): 7–32.

Midford, Paul. 2026. “Japan Eyes Lethal Weapons Exports.” East Asia Forum, February 12, 2026. https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/02/12/japan-eyes-lethal-weapons-exports/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025. Official Security Assistance (OSA). February. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100737098.pdf

Nagy, Stephen. 2021. “Sino-Japanese Reactive Diplomacy as Seen Through the Interplay of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP).” China Report 57 (1): 7–21.

Naidu, G. V. C., and Yasuyuki Ishida. 2022. “Japan’s Security Reforms under Abe Shinzo: Setting the Stage for Proactivism in the Indo-Pacific?” Strategic Analysis 46 (3): 277–292.

O’Shea, Paul, and Sebastian Maslow. 2024. “Rethinking Change in Japan’s Security Policy: Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Japan’s Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.” Policy Studies 45 (3–4): 653–76. 

Pollmann, Mina. 2026. “Japan Is Moving to Expand Defense Exports. Constitutional Revision Is a Bigger Ask.” The Diplomat, February 26, 2026. https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/japan-is-moving-to-expand-defense-exports-constitutional-revision-is-a-bigger-ask/

Rich, Motoko, and Hisako Ueno. 2023. “Japan Relaxes Export Restrictions to Sell Patriot Missiles to U.S.” New York Times, December 22, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/world/asia/japan-export-patriot-missiles-us.html

Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51, no. 1: 144–72. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814.

Sato, Mizuki. 2026. “LDP approves major change to allow lethal weapons exports.” The Asahi Shimbun: Asia & Japan Watch, February 25, 2026. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16377896